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REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE
INFLUENCE OF THIRD PARTIES ON THE
LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
INTRODUCTION
T HE Group' was urged to take a broad view of the issue of influ-
ence of third parties on the lawyer-client relationship, and not to
limit discussion to the context of Legal Services Corporation ("LSC")
funding. Most of the discussion, however, did return to the LSC re-
strictions. The Group spent time brainstorming the range of possible
issues that could be addressed, then proceeded to focus on the follow-
ing questions:
*Who are the third parties who influence the lawyer-client
relationship?
• What is the nature of their influence?
* At what point does the influence become unreasonable?
* At what point does the influence become ethically problematic?
* How should a lawyer respond to unreasonable or unethical third-
party influences?
* What are our recommendations?
In drafting recommendations, the Group tried not to harm clients
or to raise barriers for lawyers trying to assist them under less-than-
ideal circumstances. On the one hand, the group members did not
want to shy away from expressing its displeasure with the negative
impact of certain third-party influences. On the other, they did not
want to create situations in which lawyers could be sanctioned for con-
tinuing to represent clients within the restrictions placed upon them
by funders. They chose, therefore, to couch their recommendations as
comments to the Model Rules, as practice guidelines for lawyers, and
as issues for education and further study.2
I. INITIAL BRAINSTORMING OF ISSUES RAISED BY THE CHARGE
Following the general conference plan, during the first session the
Group generated a series of questions for possible discussion:
1. Group Leader: Mary C. Daly. Author- Stephanie Edelstein. Participants:
Frank P. Cervone, Stephen J. Ellmann, Barbara Glesner Fines, Lauren Hallinan, Alan
Houseman, Wilhelm H. Joseph, Jr., Samuel J. Levine, April Newbauer, and David S.
Udell.
2. See Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to
Low-Income Persons, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1751, Recommendations 78-84, at 1781-84
(1999) [hereinafter Recommendations].
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* Do we want to recommend rescission of ABA opinion 96-399?1
* Do we need to take note of restrictions imposed by the Legal Serv-
ices Corporation as unethical restrictions by third parties?
* Should we consider the ethical implications of the LSC restrictions
even though some advocates assert that Congress has been unre-
sponsive to arguments that are based on perceived ethical con-
cerns? (Is how to best deal with Congress more a question of
strategy rather than an issue to discuss in this context?)
• What about the influence of non-LSC funders?
o What about the influence of third parties other than funders, such
as legislators, or family members?
• What are the third-party influences?
* In what sense are third parties interfering in the attorney-client
relationship?
• Who is making the decisions in collaborative professional relation-
ships? (For example, in an office of lawyers and social workers,
who makes the decisions?)
* What is a reasonable limit on professional judgment?)
* To what extent do the current Model Rules4 address these issues?
Are changes to the Model Rules needed?
• Does accepting funding to handle specific legal issues pose any
ethical problem? What is a nefarious influence, what is not?
• Should our sense of what is an appropriate influence be limited to
the legal-services delivery system we have today, or should we be
looking at what changes may be on the horizon and what the over-
all system will be in the future?
* Are there, or should there be, different expectations for govern-
ment and private funders? If so, what are those expectations?
• Are there any positive third-party influences?
* Would an influence be considered good/bad/not so bad depending
on when it occurs?
* Is third-party funding per se an influence that cannot be avoided?
• Where ethics conflicts arise due to third-party influence, to what
extent are the following solutions adequate: (1) giving notice to
the client; (2) referring the client elsewhere; (3) withdrawing from
representation; (4) giving advice to the client; (5) closing down the
office; or (6) doing it on your own time?
* If, as the result of a third-party action, funding ends for a particu-
lar area of the program's practice, does the program or the individ-
ual lawyer have an ethical obligation to continue representation in
a particular case?
3. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-399
(1996). The opinion concerns the ethical obligations of lawyers whose employers are
subject to LSC funding restrictions. Id.
4. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1998).
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" If the program closes as the result of an action by a third party,
what is the individual attorney's obligation to continue
representation?
* Is the employee union a third-party influence? How would a
union exert influence over the attorney-client relationship?
Through contract demands? By striking? Through a contract that
governs the distribution of cases and the size of individual
caseloads?
" Under what circumstances are client groups a third-party
influence?
We then generated a list of possible recommendations:
* Recommend that ABA Formal Opinion 96-399 be rescinded?
* Recommend changes to the Model Rules?
* Recommend changes to the Commentary to the Model Rules?
* Recommend practice guidelines?
Where ethical conflicts do arise as a result of third-party intrusions, to
what extent are the following solutions adequate or appropriate?
• Giving notice to the client;
* Referring the client elsewhere;
* Withdrawing from representation (contacting the tribunal);
* Closing the office (not necessarily a joke);
* Giving notice to the funder;
* Continuing to advise the client on how to proceed; and
* Continuing representation on your own time.
II. NARROWING THE Focus OF THE DISCUSSION
A. Who Are the Third Parties Who Influence the Lawyer-Client
Relationship? What Is the Nature of Their Influence?
The Group considered a range of possible third parties, including
funders, regulators, boards of directors, employee unions, client
groups, family members, special-interest groups, adversaries and al-
lies, and the needs of the community. It was agreed that the nature of
the influence would vary according to who the third party is, whether
the lawyer is in the public or the private sector, and the relationship of
the third party to the lawyer.
Funders (state, federal, local, private, charitable, or private-bar)
may seek to influence the representation by attaching restrictions to
funding. These restrictions might include limits on who can be served,
or limits on the scope of the representation that can be provided. The
restrictions could be substantive (what kinds of cases a lawyer can/
cannot accept); they could be procedural (what actions a lawyer can/
cannot take in the course of the representation, e.g., administrative
only, no out-of-court advocacy); or they could be managerial (direc-
1999] 1843
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tives on staffing, or on who actually handles certain responsibilities
within the office or program).
A funder may also seek to influence the lawyer-client relationship
by limiting funding so that the lawyer is unable to provide representa-
tion that the lawyer considers adequate or professionally appropriate.
Third-party funders may impose monitoring, reporting, or auditing re-
quirements that the recipient considers inappropriate. Fiscal re-
straints such as a competitive bidding process that awards a contract
to the bidder offering the lowest cost per case, or a pre-paid union
plan that limits the cost per case, may lead to representation that the
lawyer believes to be professionally inadequate or inappropriate. A
third party may influence the representation by threatening sanctions
for activity without which the representation is inadequate. In addi-
tion, a third-party funder might influence the lawyer-client relation-
ship by restricting representation not funded by that particular funder
(e.g., LSC restrictions on non-LSC funding).
Client groups may seek to influence representation when the inter-
est of the group diverges from that of an individual client. Commu-
nity institutions may disagree with the representation in a particular
case and seek to influence that representation. Lawyers representing
children or elderly clients frequently encounter family members or
agency staffs who try to influence the lawyer-client relationship. The
Group also considered family members (e.g., a parent attempting to
influence the representation of a minor child, or an adult child at-
tempting to influence the representation of a parent with diminished
capacity); fiduciaries (e.g., a trustee or guardian); and the lawyer's so-
cial responsibility to the community at large. In some instances, the
third party may be a funder and a potential party to the action. For
example, in a child abuse case, the lawyer representing the child is
subject to influence by parents who want the child returned to them,
other family members who may also want the child, courts who do not
want to impose burdensome tasks on an overworked child welfare
agency, the social services agency which is investigating the abuse
claim and may also have awarded the program the contract under
which the child is being represented. In an adult guardianship case
where a Title III program is appointed by the court to represent the
incapacitated person, the area agency on aging which funds the Title
III program may also be the petitioner or the potential guardian.
B. At What Point Do Influences/Restrictions
Become Unreasonable?
The Group agreed that not all third-party influences are inherently
negative, and not all restricted practice is inherently unethical. They
did reach some consensus on what third-party influences could be
considered unreasonable.
[Vol. 671844
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One member compared this situation to a student who begins to
produce course work that is of lower quality than her previous work.
While going from A to B is a very significant change, it is not a dis-
qualifying problem academically; going from B to C may still be ade-
quate, or competent. The problem arises when the quality is lowered
from C to D. At D, the quality is unacceptable, or incompetent. It
was noted that the Model Rules do not allow a lawyer to obtain a
client's consent to incompetent representation.- The question is, what
is incompetent representation in a legal-services context? Do restric-
tions that limit the tools a lawyer can use rise to the level of influences
that create unethical practice, either by interfering with zealous repre-
sentation, or by rendering representation incompetent?
Most of the discussion centered on the LSC restrictions. For exam-
ple, does the LSC prohibition against seeking attorneys fees, raise an
ethical issue? How does the fact that a lawyer cannot seek fees affect
the attorney-client relationship? Some members of the Group argued
that the prohibition on attorneys' fees affects the quality of the repre-
sentation because it leaves the lawyer without the hook provided in
fee-shifting statutes that make a defendant take notice of the claim. A
lawyer who cannot ask for fees is unable to make the strongest claim,
and is therefore not practicing competently. Others argued that a
weaker claim does not necessarily mean incompetent practice. De-
pending on the facts, it may just narrow the scope, or take the repre-
sentation down a notch, from A to B. It may not be ethically
proscribed.
What makes the attorney fee situation any different from a private
attorney-client agreement? If we allow private clients to accept B-
level service, why can't we require poor clients to accept B-level ser-
vice? Doesn't funding already control the quality and level of the
services provided? What makes this any different? Is there a differ-
ence between denying a tool completely and allowing the lawyer to
use professional judgment to select the tools that will be used, within
certain parameters?
Several members of the Group felt strongly that what is unreasona-
ble is denying the lawyer the ability to use professional judgment, es-
pecially when the client has no other place to go to obtain legal
representation.
The Group attempted to set some criteria for what would constitute
an unreasonable influence by a third party. Suggestions included:
* Denying tools essential to competent representation;
5. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 cmt. [6] (1998) (stating that a
lawyer's need for income "should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that can-
not be handled competently" despite Rule 1.7's consent provisions).
1999] 1845
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* Imposing restrictions that would hurt a current client (Model Rule
1.7 states that a lawyer should not accept representation that
would materially hurt current clients);6
• Interfering with the lawyer's professional judgment;
* Any limitation imposed by an adversary for the purpose of making
representation worse;
" Funding at a level that is insufficient to provide competent
representation;
* Imposing restrictions on the use of outside funding;
" Restricting outside fundraising;
* Imposing restrictions that are unlawful or that violate an other-
wise-binding ethical rule (the recent federal restrictions on lawyers
counseling clients about planning for Medicaid eligibility7 was
raised, but it was agreed that since this is a federal law that applies
to all lawyers, it is not really an example of a third-party influence
within our parameters); and
* Restricting a program from meeting community needs (an issue of
community ethics and responsibility to the larger society).
C. At What Point Does the Influence Become
Ethically Problematic?
The Group agreed that restrictions are likely to be unreasonable
when they are imposed in the course of ongoing representation,
although they could also be unreasonable when imposed at the outset.
The group members also agreed that unreasonable restrictions are
likely to be ethically problematic. They did not reach consensus on
whether the LSC or other funding restrictions are so unreasonable as
to affect the lawyer's ability to practice ethically, although several
members felt strongly that this line had been crossed, for example, in
the context of the attorneys' fees restriction.
They discussed a number of questions. Is practicing under a restric-
tion an ethical problem if the lawyer takes the money knowing that
restriction exists ahead of time? Does accepting funding that has sub-
ject-matter restrictions that limit access to justice raise an ethical
problem? Every attorney has an individual obligation to assure access
to justice. Does the last attorney in town have a higher ethical duty?
Where is the line between restrictions that are unpleasant, that may
even be unreasonable in the eyes of a legal-services provider, and
those that lead to representation that is actually unethical? Some ar-
gue that it is still possible to provide high-quality representation under
the restrictions. How, then, should we categorize interference that
goes to the basic core of the representation? What about restrictions
that impede the ability to be a zealous advocate? Is this even the
6. Id. Rule 1.7.
7. See 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(a)(6) (Supp. 11 1996).
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proper inquiry to be making? The issue of attorneys' fees and similar
tools was raised once more. If a lawyer cannot seek attorneys' fees,
can he or she still advocate zealously? Would it be possible to argue
that restrictions deny competent counsel, or effective assistance of
counsel? Some members of the Group felt strongly that the prohibi-
tion against seeking attorneys' fees seriously interferes with compe-
tent representation, especially in cases where the threat of fees would
be an essential tool in negotiating a fair settlement. Others had diffi-
culty finding an ethical issue in the prohibition against seeking attor-
neys fees.
The Group discussed differences between funder restrictions as to
the scope of services (i.e., eligibility guidelines, kinds of cases) (no
consensus on acceptability), third-party restrictions such as not being
able to request attorneys' fees (no consensus on acceptability), and
the program's own decision to limit the kinds of services that are pro-
vided or the scope of those services. Knowing that the limited-service
issue was the topic for another group, our group's participants did not
address it.8
D. How Should a Lawyer Respond to Unreasonable or
Unethical Third-Party Influences?
If an attorney has determined that a third-party influence is unrea-
sonable, for whatever reason, what is the appropriate response? Is
there a difference between legal-services and private sector practice in
what clients should be asked to accept? What are the consequences of
taking a position that legal-services practice under some restrictions
would be unethical? Does that leave a lawyer only two choices-to
refuse to represent under those conditions or to practice unethically?
The Group wanted to avoid suggesting that nobody should practice in
a legal-services program under the current restrictions. Under Model
Rule 1.2, the scope of the services may be limited by agreement with
the client, or by outside restrictions on types of cases.9 The terms of
the representation may exclude certain tools (e.g., that the client is
told that the lawyer will not seek attorneys' fees although the statute
permits it, and is further told that the client's case is weakened as a
consequence). On the other hand, under Model Rule 1.2, a potential
client may not be asked to agree to representation that is so limited in
scope that it falls below the level of competent representation."0
Several possible options were offered, including referring the client
elsewhere, withdrawing from representation, giving notice to the
funder, giving limited advice to the client, closing down the office, and
continuing with the representation on the lawyer's own time. All
8. See Report of the Working Group on Limited Legal Assistance, 67 Fordhan L
Rev. 1819 (1999).
9. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2 cnt. (1998).
10. See id.
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agreed that these options were not to be taken lightly, and that there
may not be another lawyer available to represent a legal-services
client.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF RECOMMENDATIONS"
The group members recognized that third-party influences in the
context of a legal-services practice come from funders, whether public
or private, and they chose not to focus exclusively on the Legal Serv-
ices Corporation.12 They decided that the goal of the recommenda-
tions should be to guide the legal community and to educate
individuals associated with legal-services programs and the universe of
potential funders (e.g., IOLTA, LSC, charitable foundations, unions,
LSC boards, lawyers, bar associations, punitive-damages funds, bar as-
sociations, and local agencies). Even so, much of the discussion con-
cerned the LSC restrictions. Some members felt strongly that the
organized bar should take a public position, in its ethics rules and else-
where, that restrictions on lawyering for the poor are an attack on the
profession, the poor, and the rule of law, and are unacceptable.
There was a difference of opinion within the Group on the value of
seeking rescission of ABA Opinion 96-399. Those supporting seeking
rescission argued that it is important to voice opposition to 96-399 be-
cause it is still on the books, and because it makes the LSC restrictions
seem ethically tolerable when they are not. Others asserted that en-
ergy need not be expended on 96-399 since it was already moot and
since it is unlikely that the ABA would revisit it. The Group discussed
whether hearings on Ethics 2000 would be an appropriate forum for
proposing rescission.
The Group wanted to send a message that funders of lawyering pro-
grams for the poor and the legal profession should not impose unrea-
sonable restrictions, and that restrictions that necessitate withdrawal
are objectionable. They chose not to recommend changes to the ac-
tual Model Rules, because they did not want to put legal-services law-
yers in the untenable position of choosing between sanctions for
unethical behavior and not accepting funding, or withdrawing. As a
model for how to approach this troublesome issue, it was suggested
that the Group consider the recently adopted commentary to Model
Rule 1.14, regarding emergency representation of incapacitated cli-
ents. 13 There, the commentary to the rules provides guidance to law-
11. Not all members of the working group were able to attend all sessions, so not
all members voted on each and every recommendation. The recommendations
express the sense of those members who were present at the time they were selected
for presentation to the plenary assembly.
12. Because issues of influence from close family members, fiduciaries, and others
similarly situated have been addressed in previous conferences, the Group chose to
focus on funders.
13. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14 cmts. [6]-[7] (1998).
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yers without imposing sanctionable requirements. The Group also
considered adding language or a comment to Model Rule 5.4, which
addresses the professional independence of a lawyer,1 4 and maybe an
ethical consideration elaborating on DR 5-107(B), which addresses in-
fluence on the lawyer by those other than the client. " Ethicists in the
Group advised that lawyers couldn't be sanctioned under either the
commentary to the disciplinary rules or the ethical considerations ac-
companying the rules.
In considering possible practice guidelines, the Group rejected a
suggestion that a lawyer should always have a duty to challenge re-
strictions that the lawyer considers unethical or intrusive. The guide-
lines are intended as suggestions to be utilized in appropriate
circumstances, in accordance with the lawyer's professional judgment.
For example, the group members recognized that there would be
times when a lawyer feels bound to withdraw because a restriction
would compromise representation or render it incompetent. They
considered practice guidelines for those circumstances. The recom-
mendations reflect the sense of the Group that challenging a third-
party restriction that the lawyer considers unethical is an option. They
also reflect the sense that a motion to withdraw may be required, or
may be a mechanism for enabling a reviewing body to assess the con-
stitutionality of the restrictions.
The issue of "consent" led into a discussion of whether a lawyer in a
legal-services program may ask a client to consent to representation
that is limited because of the restrictions. In some contexts, it may be
appropriate; in others, it may not. It was noted that Model Rule
1.8(f), the current rule covering situations when one party pays a law-
yer to provide services for another, requires client consent to be com-
pletely voluntary, and is written for the private market, not poverty
law.' 6 That rule, moreover, concerns the release of confidential infor-
mation, and the lawyer's loyalty to the client, not the scope of repre-
sentation. While it is acceptable to obtain client consent to have
14. Model Rule 5.4 (c) provides: "A lawyer shall not permit a person who recom-
mends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or
regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services." Id. Rule
5.4 (c).
15. DR 5-107(B) provides: "A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends,
employs, or pays him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his
professional judgment in rendering such legal services." Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 5-107(B) (1981).
16. Model Rule 1.8(f) provides:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one
other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation; (2) there is no interference with
the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-law-
yer relationship; and (3) information relating to representation of a client is
protected as required by rule 1.6.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(f) (1998).
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someone else sit in on an interview, a low-income person's limited
access to lawyers may be a coercive influence that compromises the
client's ability to consent to revealing confidential information, or to
restricted representation.
The Group was cautioned about the perils of recommending
changes to the disciplinary rules, violations of which would be subject
to sanctions. For example, if the Group were to suggest that the con-
sent of a legal-services client to limited representation is ethically in-
valid, what happens when the lawyer is required by law to limit
representation? The lawyer might be obligated to challenge the law,
or to withdraw. Similarly, if the Group were to recommend that it is
unethical for a lawyer to reveal client information at the behest of a
funder, what does the lawyer do when Congress says LSC has right to
obtain client names? Again, a legal challenge, or withdrawal, may be
necessary. On the other hand, we do not want to ignore the issue of
the legal-services lawyer who is very uncomfortable with getting con-
sent that the lawyer believes to be coercive because there are no other
choices for the client who cannot pay. Several members voiced con-
cern that client consent is being used to make a practice seem some-
how acceptable, when in reality it is not, and urged the Group to
express the sense that client consent under these circumstances is
troublesome, even if it can be manipulated to fit within the ethical
rules. How can that sense be expressed in a recommendation, without
punishing the lawyer who is simply trying to represent the client? The
Group agreed that we must avoid taking a position that would make
current practice by legal-services lawyers unethical. Possible language
might read: Limited access to lawyers is a coercive influence that
compromises the client's ability to consent to restrictions imposed by
third parties, including limitations on the scope and manner of repre-
sentation, conflicts of interest, and disclosure of information relating
to the representation.
During the final session on Saturday afternoon, the Group reviewed
the discussions of the previous sessions, and extracted points that
could be collected into recommendations. It was agreed that the rec-
ommendations would include: (1) changes to the commentary to the
Model Rules (with the understanding that the commentary is intended
as guidance to the profession, and is not sanctionable); (2) identifica-
tion of issues for further study; and (3) suggestions for education. The
Group took into consideration earlier discussions and the general con-
sensus that lawyers should not be sanctioned for providing representa-
tion while complying with restrictions imposed by funders upon that
representation. The Group also took into account the original charge
and the consensus of the Group that the recommendations should not
be directed exclusively towards funding by the Legal Services Corpo-
ration. One participant offered to circulate a sign-up sheet at the ple-
nary, to collect the names of those interested in working together to
[Vol. 671850
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educate private foundations about the ethical issues that arise from
third-party influence. 17
The recommendations of the Group were adopted by a clear major-
ity at the plenary session, but a substantial minority of participants
expressed their concern that the recommendations included changes
to the Model Rules that, because the entire federally funded legal
services program is operating under restrictions, could subject individ-
ual attorneys to sanctions. This was not the intention of the Group,
and the words "comments to" have been added to the Preamble, to
reflect the group's intent that the recommendations be directed to the
commentary to the rules.
In a December 15, 1998 Memorandum, Alan Houseman, who was
unable to be present for the final group discussion, voiced his disa-
greement with some of the recommendations as he interprets them."
Mr. Houseman opposes any implication that the existing restrictions
on LSC recipients are unethical under Model Rule 1.8(f.19 He notes
that Model Rule 1.2 allows lawyers to restrict the scope of representa-
tion when required to do so by a funder, so long as they make the
client aware of the restriction before representation has begun and so
long as they do not render incompetent representation.20 Mr. House-
man also disagrees with Recommendation Eighty2' to the extent that
it suggests that withdrawal, if required by law, is objectionable, and to
the extent that it suggests that a lawyer should challenge any law that
requires withdrawal. z Finally, Mr. Houseman objects to Recommen-
dation Eighty-oneP insofar as it suggests that a client cannot consent
to representation that is subject to the LSC restrictions on the scope
and manner of representation.24
17. Alan Houseman, who was unable to attend all the sessions, has expressed disa-
greement with some of these recommendations.
18. Memorandum from Alan W. Housman, Executive Director, Center for Law
and Social Policy, to Conference Participants 1-3 (Dec. 15, 1998) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Memorandum].
19. See id. at 1.
20. See id. at 2.
21. Recommendations, supra note 2, Recommendation 80, at 1782.
22. See Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2-3.
23. Id. Recommendation 81, at 1782-83.
24. See Memorandum, supra note 18, at 3.
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